John A.
Christmann

About Me

My name is John Christmann and I’m a philosophy PhD student at Florida State University. My research interests include topics in metaethics, metaphysics, and epistemology. In metaethics, I am researching potential solutions to the “Now What?” problem for moral error theory. In metaphysics, I explore the relationship between abstract objects and causation. In epistemology, I am currently researching epistemic normativity, the parallels between epistemology and ethics, and theories of belief-formation. I’m also interested in conceptual engineering and experimental philosophy.

Publications

The Power of Negativity: A Theory of Abstract Entities (Philosophia 2019)

In this paper, I articulate and solve a puzzle originally presented by Gideon Rosen. The puzzle challenges us to produce a causal criterion that distinguishes concrete objects from abstract objects, even though it seems like abstract objects are constituents of events that enter into causal relations. My solution is to identify concrete objects with objects that have dispositions to manifest causal powers.

Works in progress

We Believe the Error Theory

In this paper I provide an argument against Bart Streumer's thesis that we cannot believe the error theory. I begin by presenting evidence against the Cartesian model of belief-fixation. I then show how Streumer's argument for his thesis commits him to the Cartesian model. I then conclude with a discussion about how the Spinozan should respond to Matt Lutz's Now What? problem for global normative error theory.

Spinozan Moral Conservationism

In this paper, I argue that the Spinozan error theorist must adopt moral conservationism as her solution to the "Now What?" problem. The "Now What?" problem is introduced alongside the various potential solutions in the literature. I then attempt to make the Spinozan view compatible with those potential solutions and come out with a form of Spinozan moral conservationism. I wrap things up with responses to objections.

Reliabilism and the new evil demon problem

In this paper, I argue that Jennifer Nagel's debunking explanation of intuitions elicited by internalist thought experiments is unsatisfactory. I then consider whether Alvin Goldman's strategy fairs any better, and conclude that it does not.

Spinozan minds: some epistemic implications

In this paper, I explore some epistemic implications of the Spinozan theory of belief-fixation. First, I articulate a brief case in favor of the Spinozan theory. Then, I show how there can be constitutive norms of belief on the Spinozan theory. I then argue that Spinozan minds can engage in doxastic deliberation. Finally, I argue that Spinozan minds can be epistemically responsible for their beliefs, and then I deal with objections.

Desert in the state of nature

In this paper, I develop an argument against Vargas's two-tiered theory of desert. I argue that any theory that requires consequentialist considerations as part of the desert base runs up against state of nature counterexamples. I then reply to objections.

Absurd World

In this paper, I argue for a novel form of absurdity. Normative absurdity occurs when there is an extreme mismatch between how things are and how they should be. I then connect the idea of normative absurdity to the meaning of life.

For a full list of my publications and drafts, click here.

Areas of Interest

Metaethics

Metaphysics

Epistemology

Conceptual Engineering

Experimental Philosophy

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